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ExploreBusinessEconomicsOligopoly, Game Theory and Antitrust: Exam-Level Quiz

Quiz · Hard

Oligopoly, Game Theory and Antitrust: Exam-Level Quiz

Calculation and reasoning questions on HHI, Cournot, Bertrand, payoff matrices, kinked demand, price discrimination and antitrust history.

by Kill h.20 questionsCreated Nov 20, 2026, 08:29 PM
Economics· Market StructuresTags#economics#oligopoly#game-theory#antitrust

20 questions

  1. 1

    Four firms hold market shares of 40, 30, 20 and 10 percent. What is the HHI?

    • A

      10,000

    • 3,000

    • C

      100

    • D

      1,000

    1,600 + 900 + 400 + 100 = 3,000. The 100 is the CR4 (as a percent), not the HHI.

  2. 2

    In a Cournot duopoly with P = 100 - Q and MC = 10, what is each firm's output?

    • 30

    • B

      22.5

    • C

      90

    • D

      45

    Best response: Q1 = (90 - Q2)/2. Symmetric: Q = 30 each. 45 is the monopoly output, and 90 is the competitive one.

  3. 3

    In the same Cournot duopoly, what is the market price?

    • A

      $30

    • $40

    • C

      $10

    • D

      $55

    Total Q = 60, P = 100 - 60 = 40. The $55 is the monopoly price, and $10 is the Bertrand price.

  4. 4

    Two firms producing identical goods with the same constant MC compete on price (Bertrand). The equilibrium price is...

    • A

      halfway between MC and the monopoly price

    • B

      the monopoly price

    • C

      above MC but below the monopoly price

    • equal to marginal cost

    Any price above MC invites undercutting, so both firms price at MC.

  5. 5

    In this payoff matrix, what is the Nash equilibrium?

    • A

      Row defects and column cooperates, giving (5, 0)

    • B

      There is no Nash equilibrium

    • C

      Both cooperate, giving (3, 3)

    • Both defect, giving (1, 1)

    Defecting is a dominant strategy for each player. Mutual cooperation would be better for both, but isn't stable.

    Image: Christopher X Jon Jensen and Greg Riestenberg, CC BY-SA 3.0, via Wikimedia Commons.

  6. 6

    Which feature distinguishes the kinked demand curve model?

    • A

      Rivals never react to price changes

    • Rivals match price cuts but not price increases

    • C

      Firms choose quantities simultaneously

    • D

      Rivals match price increases but not price cuts

    This makes demand elastic above the kink and inelastic below it, so prices are sticky.

    Image: Sheitan (English Wikipedia) and Jarry1250, CC BY-SA 3.0, via Wikimedia Commons.

  7. 7

    In the kinked demand model, why can marginal cost change without changing price?

    • A

      Marginal revenue is constant

    • B

      Demand is perfectly elastic

    • C

      Fixed costs don't matter

    • Marginal revenue has a vertical gap at the kinked quantity

    If MC passes through the gap, the profit-maximizing output stays the same.

  8. 8

    A monopolist faces P = 100 - 2Q and MC = 20. What is the deadweight loss compared with competition?

    • A

      1,600

    • 400

    • C

      200

    • D

      800

    Competitive Q = 40, monopoly Q = 20 and P = 60. DWL = 1/2 x (60 - 20) x (40 - 20) = 400.

  9. 9

    The Lerner index for a firm with |PED| = 4 is...

    • A

      0.75

    • B

      4

    • 0.25

    • D

      1

    L = 1/|E| = 1/4. A firm with more inelastic demand has a larger markup.

  10. 10

    A monopolist is operating where demand is inelastic. What should it do?

    • A

      Lower price

    • B

      Keep price and quantity

    • Raise price, because revenue rises and costs fall

    • D

      Raise output

    On the inelastic range, MR is negative, so a smaller output raises revenue and lowers cost.

  11. 11

    An industry has ten firms with equal 10% shares. A merger of two of them changes the HHI from 1,000 to...

    • A

      2,000

    • B

      1,400

    • C

      1,100

    • 1,200

    The merged firm has 20%, so HHI = 400 + 8 x 100 = 1,200. A merger raises the HHI by 2 x s1 x s2 = 200.

  12. 12

    Which law, passed in 1890, made monopolization and agreements in restraint of trade illegal?

    • The Sherman Antitrust Act

    • B

      The Federal Trade Commission Act

    • C

      The Clayton Act

    • D

      The Robinson-Patman Act

    The Clayton and FTC acts came in 1914.

  13. 13

    What was the main outcome of the 1911 Supreme Court case against Standard Oil?

    • A

      It became a regulated utility

    • The company was broken into 34 separate firms

    • C

      It was fined but left intact

    • D

      It was allowed to merge further

    The case applied the Sherman Act to dissolve the trust.

  14. 14

    A repeated prisoner's dilemma with no known end can sustain cooperation because...

    • A

      the payoffs change

    • defection can be punished in later rounds

    • C

      each firm has a monopoly

    • D

      defection is no longer a dominant strategy in any single round

    The threat of future retaliation (tit for tat) can outweigh the one-time gain from cheating.

  15. 15

    Why do cartels tend to be unstable?

    • Each member can gain by secretly cheating on its quota

    • B

      Consumers refuse to buy

    • C

      The product is homogeneous

    • D

      Demand is perfectly elastic

    The price is above MC, so each firm would like to sell more, and if all cheat the cartel price collapses.

  16. 16

    A monopolist price discriminates perfectly. Compared with a single-price monopoly, what happens to output and deadweight loss?

    • A

      Output is unchanged

    • B

      Deadweight loss rises

    • Output rises to the efficient level and deadweight loss disappears

    • D

      Output falls and deadweight loss rises

    Each buyer is charged their maximum willingness to pay, so every unit with value above MC is sold, but all the surplus goes to the monopolist.

  17. 17

    A government forces a natural monopoly to price at marginal cost. What is the typical problem?

    • A

      The firm earns a large profit

    • B

      Output falls

    • The firm makes a loss and may need a subsidy

    • D

      Price rises above average cost

    With falling average cost, MC is below ATC, so P = MC doesn't cover total cost.

  18. 18

    What would an oligopolist expect after cutting price in the kinked demand model?

    • A

      Rivals ignore the cut

    • Rivals match the cut, so sales rise by little

    • C

      Sales double

    • D

      Rivals raise price

    That is why demand is inelastic below the kink.

  19. 19

    For a monopolist with a linear demand curve P = a - bQ, MR has what slope?

    • A

      The same as demand: -b

    • B

      Zero

    • C

      Half as steep: -b/2

    • Twice as steep as demand: -2b

    MR = a - 2bQ. This is why MR cuts the quantity axis at half the demand quantity.

  20. 20

    Four firms with equal shares of 25 percent each: which statement is correct?

    • A

      HHI = 1,000 and CR4 = 100 percent

    • B

      HHI = 2,500 and CR4 = 25 percent

    • C

      HHI = 100 and CR4 = 25 percent

    • HHI = 2,500 and CR4 = 100 percent

    HHI = 4 x 25^2 = 2,500, and the top four firms hold all of the market.