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ExploreBusinessMicroeconomicsMicroeconomics: Market Structures, Calculations and Diagrams

Quiz · Hard

Microeconomics: Market Structures, Calculations and Diagrams

Harder numerical questions on monopoly pricing, deadweight loss, price discrimination, Cournot and Stackelberg models and merger HHI.

by Kill h.16 questionsCreated Nov 20, 2026, 08:29 PM
Microeconomics· Market StructuresTags#market-structures#calculations#monopoly#cournot

16 questions

  1. 1

    Demand is , MC = 20 (no fixed cost). The deadweight loss from monopoly is:

    • A

      200

    • B

      800

    • 400

    • D

      1,600

    Monopoly Q = 20, P = 60; competitive Q = 40, P = 20. DWL = ½ × (60 - 20) × (40 - 20) = 400. 800 is the monopoly profit, and 1,600 is the producer surplus under perfect price discrimination.

  2. 2

    Demand is , MC = 20. The monopolist's consumer surplus at its profit-maximizing price is:

    • 400

    • B

      200

    • C

      800

    • D

      1,600

    At Q = 20 and P = 60, CS = ½ × (100 - 60) × 20 = 400. Under competition (Q = 40, P = 20) CS would be 1,600.

  3. 3

    Market A: , market B: , MC = 10. A third-degree price-discriminating monopolist charges:

    • A

      20 in A and 30 in B

    • B

      30 in both

    • C

      40 in A and 20 in B

    • 30 in A and 20 in B

    MR = MC in each: A: 50 - 2Q = 10 gives Q = 20, P = 30. B: 30 - 2Q = 10 gives Q = 10, P = 20. Elasticity is 1.5 in A and 2 in B, so the less elastic market pays more.

  4. 4

    A monopolist has MC = $12 and at the optimum. Its price is:

    • A

      $12

    • $16

    • C

      $14

    • D

      $48

    . The $48 multiplies by the elasticity without subtracting 1.

  5. 5

    , MC = 10. In a Cournot duopoly, total industry profit is:

    • A

      900

    • 1,800

    • C

      2,025

    • D

      4,050

    Each firm produces 30 at P = 40 and earns (40 - 10) × 30 = 900; total 1,800. The monopoly profit of 2,025 is higher, which is why the firms would like to collude.

  6. 6

    , MC = 10. In a Stackelberg game the leader produces and the follower responds. Total output and price are:

    • A

      Q = 60, P = 40

    • B

      Q = 45, P = 55

    • Q = 67.5, P = 32.5

    • D

      Q = 90, P = 10

    Leader 45, follower (90 - 45)/2 = 22.5, so Q = 67.5 and P = 100 - 67.5 = 32.5. The output is larger than Cournot (60) because the leader commits to a high quantity.

  7. 7

    , MC = 10. Three Cournot firms are in the market. The price is:

    • $32.50

    • B

      $55

    • C

      $40

    • D

      $10

    Each produces 90/4 = 22.5, so Q = 67.5 and . With two firms the price is $40, and as n grows the price falls toward MC = $10.

  8. 8

    In a market with the cartel output (), one of two members cheats. Its best response to the other's 22.5 is:

    • A

      22.5

    • B

      45

    • C

      67.5

    • 33.75

    . Its profit rises to about 1,139 from 1,012.5 while the other's falls, so cheating is attractive.

  9. 9

    A merger combines firms with shares of 20% and 15% (other shares unchanged). The increase in HHI is:

    • A

      35

    • B

      325

    • 600

    • D

      1,225

    After the merger: 35² = 1,225. Before: 20² + 15² = 625. The increase is 600 (= 2 × 20 × 15).

  10. 10

    A natural monopoly has ATC falling and MC below ATC at the market demand. A price cap set at P = ATC leads to:

    • Zero economic profit with some deadweight loss compared with P = MC

    • B

      Economic profit and no deadweight loss

    • C

      Losses and a need for subsidy

    • D

      A price below MC

    Average-cost pricing (P = ATC) lets the firm break even, but since P > MC, output is below the efficient level, so deadweight loss remains. P = MC would need a subsidy.

  11. 11

    In the monopoly diagram, which curve lies below the demand curve at every positive output?

    • A

      MC

    • B

      ATC

    • C

      AR

    • MR

    Because the monopolist must cut price on all units to sell more, marginal revenue is less than price at every quantity.

    Image: Sheitan (English Wikipedia) and Jarry1250, CC BY-SA 3.0, via Wikimedia Commons.

  12. 12

    Under perfect price discrimination with and MC = 20, the monopolist's profit (no fixed cost) is:

    • A

      800

    • 1,600

    • C

      1,200

    • D

      2,000

    Output rises to 40 and the firm captures the whole area between demand and MC: ½ × (100 - 20) × 40 = 1,600, twice the single-price profit of 800.

  13. 13

    A competitive firm has TC = 50 + Q². The market price falls from $20 to $8. In the short run, with no variable cost other than Q²:

    • A

      It shuts down since profit is negative

    • It produces 4 units and earns a loss of 34

    • C

      It produces 8 units

    • D

      It produces 4 units and earns a profit

    MC = 2Q = 8 gives Q = 4. TR = 32, TC = 50 + 16 = 66, loss = 34. P = 8 exceeds AVC = Q = 4, so it keeps producing; shutting down would lose the whole fixed cost of 50.

  14. 14

    The kinked demand curve fails as a complete theory mainly because:

    • A

      It predicts price wars

    • B

      It assumes perfect competition

    • It does not explain how the price was set initially

    • D

      It ignores marginal cost

    The model takes the price at the kink as given, so it explains price rigidity but not the original price level.

    Image: Sheitan (English Wikipedia) and Jarry1250, CC BY-SA 3.0, via Wikimedia Commons.

  15. 15

    In the figure, BR1 and BR2 are the two firms' best-response curves. Which point is the Cournot-Nash equilibrium?

    • Point C

    • B

      Point A

    • C

      Point B

    • D

      Point D

    The Nash equilibrium is where both firms are on their best-response curves at once, which is the crossing point C. A and B are intercepts, where one firm acts as a monopolist and the other produces nothing; D is not on either curve, so at least one firm could gain by changing output.

    Image: Pawel Zdziarski (faxe), Astarot, Everlong and Jarry1250, CC BY-SA 3.0, via Wikimedia Commons.

  16. 16

    Free entry in monopolistic competition ensures that in the long run:

    • A

      Firms earn positive profit

    • B

      Price equals marginal cost

    • C

      Firms produce at minimum ATC

    • Price equals average total cost

    Entry continues until demand is tangent to ATC, so P = ATC and economic profit is zero. P exceeds MC and output is to the left of minimum ATC.