Quiz · Hard
Twenty hard bar-exam style questions on the Rule Against Perpetuities, future interests, recording acts, adverse possession, leases, servitudes, mortgages and takings.
O conveys "to A for life, then to the children of B who reach age 25." B is alive and has two children, ages 20 and 10. Under the common law Rule Against Perpetuities, what is the result?
The gift is valid, because every child of B will reach 25 within 21 years of B's death
The gift to B's children is void, because B could have another child who reaches 25 more than 21 years after all lives in being have ended
The gift is valid, because it is a vested remainder
The gift is void only as to the afterborn children, and the two living children take
The gift is a class gift subject to a condition precedent, so it is a contingent remainder. At the creation of the interest, B could have another child and then die. That child could reach 25 more than 21 years after A, B and B's living children have all died. Under the common law Rule, a class gift is void as to all members if it is void as to any, so the entire gift fails. A and O (reversion) take what is left.
O conveys "to A for life, then to B and her heirs, but if B ever sells alcohol on the land, then to C." How is C's interest classified?
A shifting executory interest
A contingent remainder
A possibility of reverter
A right of entry
C takes, if at all, by cutting short a vested estate held by B (a transferee, not the grantor), which makes it a shifting executory interest. A remainder cannot cut short a prior estate, and a possibility of reverter or right of entry belongs to the grantor. B holds a vested remainder in fee simple subject to an executory limitation.
O conveys Blackacre to A, who does not record. O then makes a gift of Blackacre to B, who records without knowing about A. A then records. The jurisdiction has a notice recording statute. Who owns Blackacre?
B, because B recorded first without notice
B, because A failed to record promptly
Neither, until the court quiets title
A, because B did not give value
Notice statutes protect only a subsequent bona fide purchaser, who must give value and lack notice. B took as a donee and gave no value, so B is not a BFP and cannot take priority over A's earlier conveyance, even though A had not recorded.
O conveys to A, who does not record. O conveys to B, who pays value, has no notice, and records. B then conveys to C, who has actual knowledge of A's deed. A sues C. Who wins in a notice jurisdiction?
A, because C had notice of the earlier deed
A, because A's deed was the first in time
C, because of the shelter rule
Neither, because C is not a BFP
B was a BFP and cut off A's rights. Under the shelter rule, a person who takes from a BFP receives the BFP's protection, even if the transferee has notice. Otherwise B could not freely sell the property.
In 2000, X enters a vacant lot owned by Y, who was then 12 years old, and openly occupies it as an owner. The statutory period is 15 years, and the statute tolls the period during a minority until the owner turns 18. Y turns 18 in 2006. In 2018, Y sues to eject X. What is the likely result?
X wins, because X has possessed the land for 18 years
Y wins, because the period did not begin until 2006 and has not expired
X wins, because Y waited too long after turning 18
Y wins, but only if Y can prove X's possession was not open
Disability at the time the claim accrues (when X entered) delays the start of the limitations period until the disability ends. The period began in 2006 and would expire in 2021. A later disability would not stop the running of the period, but this disability existed at accrual.
L leases a building to T for 5 years. After 2 years, T transfers all of T's remaining interest to S. S fails to pay rent. Who can L sue for the rent?
Both S (privity of estate) and T (privity of contract)
Only S, because T no longer has any interest
Only T, because S never contracted with L
Neither, until L gives notice to cure
A transfer of the entire remaining term is an assignment. The assignee is in privity of estate with the landlord and is liable for the covenants that run with the land, including rent. The original tenant stays liable under privity of contract unless released by a novation.
T leases a building from L for 5 years. After 2 years, T subleases to S for 2 years, keeping the last year. S fails to pay rent. Who can L sue?
S only
Both T and S
Neither T nor S
T only
A transfer of less than the entire term is a sublease. The sublessee has no privity of estate or contract with the landlord. T remains liable to L, and T can sue S.
A has an easement appurtenant across B's land. A later buys B's land, then sells the original dominant parcel to C without mentioning the easement, and keeps the rest of B's former land. Does C have the easement?
Yes, because an appurtenant easement runs with the dominant land
Yes, because C is a successor to A
No, the easement was extinguished by merger and was not revived
Yes, but only if C records
When one person owns both the dominant and servient estates, the easement is extinguished by merger. It is not revived when they are separated again, unless created anew (for example, by implication from prior use or by express grant).
O owns Lots 1 and 2. O sells Lot 1 to A with a written covenant, signed by A, that neither A nor A's successors will build above two stories, intended to benefit Lot 2. A sells to B, who knew of the covenant, and B builds three stories. O sues B for an injunction. Which is the best analysis?
O cannot enforce it, because there is no horizontal privity
O can enforce the covenant as an equitable servitude, because privity is not required
O can only recover damages
O cannot enforce it, because B is not in privity of contract with O
An equitable servitude needs a writing, intent that it bind successors, touch and concern, and notice. B had actual notice. Horizontal and vertical privity are required for a real covenant (damages at law), but not for an injunction in equity.
A developer sells 40 of 50 lots in a subdivision under a general plan, each deed containing a restriction to single-family homes. The developer then sells Lot 41 by a deed with no restriction to a buyer who knows of the plan. The buyer plans to build a gas station. A neighbor sues. Result?
The restriction is enforceable against Lot 41 as an implied reciprocal servitude
The restriction is unenforceable, because the deed to Lot 41 did not contain it
The restriction is enforceable only if the developer sues
The restriction is unenforceable, because the neighbor lacks privity
A common scheme of development, with most lots sold under the restriction, creates an implied reciprocal servitude on the remaining lots for buyers with notice. Notice can be actual (the buyer knew), record, or inquiry. Privity is not required for equitable servitudes.
L and T orally agree to a two-year lease. T moves in and pays rent monthly. After six months, L wants T out. Which statement is most accurate?
The lease is fully enforceable for two years because T took possession
T is a trespasser from the start
T is a tenant at will who can be removed at any time without notice
The oral lease is unenforceable under the statute of frauds, but T has at least a month-to-month periodic tenancy
A lease for more than one year must be in writing. An oral lease for a longer term is generally unenforceable as such, but the tenant who takes possession and pays periodic rent usually becomes a periodic tenancy (here month to month), terminable on proper notice. Part performance is accepted in some states to enforce the term.
A city ordinance prohibits all construction on a beachfront lot to protect the dunes, and the owner bought the lot for building. The ordinance leaves the lot with no economically beneficial use. Under Lucas, what is the result?
No taking, because the ordinance serves a legitimate public purpose
No taking, unless the owner is denied all value for 10 years
A per se taking, unless the restriction is part of background principles of state nuisance or property law
A taking, regardless of background principles
A regulation that deprives land of all economically beneficial use is a categorical taking, unless the restriction inheres in the background principles of the state's property and nuisance law. Legitimacy of the purpose does not matter in a total wipeout.
D owes J a judgment, and J's judgment lien attached to all of D's land in the county. Later, D buys a house with a loan from Bank, secured by a purchase money mortgage recorded after the judgment lien. Who has priority in the house?
J, because the judgment lien was first in time
Bank
J, because Bank recorded later
Both share pro rata
A purchase money mortgage has priority over earlier liens against the buyer, such as judgment liens, because the lien attaches only to what the debtor owns, and the debtor acquires the property subject to the purchase money mortgage.
A and B own land as tenants in common. A lives on the land for 25 years, pays all the taxes, and never excludes B. B has not visited. Now B demands partition. The statutory period for adverse possession is 20 years. What is the most likely result?
B may have partition; A has not adversely possessed against B because A never ousted B
A owns the whole by adverse possession
A owns the whole, because A paid all the taxes
B is barred, because B did not use the land
A co-tenant's possession is not hostile to the other co-tenants, since each has the right to possess the whole. Adverse possession by a co-tenant requires an ouster or a clear repudiation communicated to the other. Paying taxes helps A seek contribution, but does not make A the owner.
Which of the following is an example of permissive waste by a life tenant?
Cutting timber for sale
Demolishing a house to build an apartment building
Opening a new mine on the land
Failing to repair a leaking roof, which allows the house to rot
Permissive waste is a failure to take reasonable care of the property (repairs, taxes). Voluntary waste is an affirmative act that damages the property (cutting timber, mining). Changes that alter the character of the property are ameliorative waste.
O signs and acknowledges a deed to her daughter D, puts it in her desk, and tells D, "This will be yours when I die." O dies. D finds the deed. Who owns the land?
D, because the deed was signed and acknowledged
D, because O expressed an intention to give the land to D
O's estate, because there was no present delivery of the deed
D, but only if the deed was recorded
A deed must be delivered with the intention that it take effect immediately. A deed that is meant to take effect only at the grantor's death is testamentary and is invalid unless the will formalities are met. Possession of the deed by the grantee after the grantor's death does not create a delivery.
A, who does not own Blackacre, conveys it to B by a general warranty deed. Two years later A buys Blackacre from the true owner. B and A now both claim Blackacre. Who owns it?
A, because A now holds record title
B, under the doctrine of estoppel by deed (after-acquired title)
The true owner, because the deed to B was void
Neither, until B sues for breach of covenant
When a grantor conveys by a deed with covenants of title (general or special warranty) and later acquires the land, the title passes automatically to the grantee. A cannot assert the later-acquired title against B. A quitclaim deed would not trigger the doctrine.
Under a contract of sale, the seller will convey "marketable title." At closing, the seller's title rests only on the seller's claim of adverse possession of a strip of land, which no court has confirmed. May the buyer refuse to close?
Yes, because title acquired by adverse possession is unmarketable until judicially established
No, because adverse possession gives title automatically
No, because marketable title need not be perfect
Yes, but only if the strip is more than 10 percent of the lot
Title by adverse possession vests when the period runs, but it rests on facts that can be disputed. A court would not force a buyer to take a title that invites litigation. Marketable title is title reasonably free from doubt, so it is not met until a judgment quiets the title.
What does the "touch and concern" requirement mean for a covenant running with the land?
The covenant must be recorded
The covenant must benefit the original covenantee personally
The covenant must have been made in a lease
The covenant must relate to the use, value or enjoyment of the land, rather than being personal to the parties
A covenant touches and concerns the land if it affects the parties as landowners: its burden or benefit changes the use or value of the land (for example, a promise not to build, or to pay assessments). Personal promises do not run with the land.